CENTRO INTERNACIONAL DE TOLEDO PARA LA PAZ

BUILDING VIABLE STATES

Lessons and challenges of the process of State construction in Central America

CITpax Document nº 4

24 February 2006

CITpax Documents are available in the web page: www.toledopax.org

SYNOPSIS

I.- Introduction. Preliminary considerations

- The viability of the State: conditioning factors
- How should we approach the analysis of the State, its viability and State building in Central America?

II.- Geography, Demography and History. Factors and legacies for State building in Central America

- The pre-Columbian legacy
- The Spanish legacy
- The legacy of independence

III.- Interconnections: a compared approach to State building processes in Central America

- A single Nation in five States?
- Building agro-exporter republics
- Crisis of the agro-exporter model, mass rebellion and emergence of military regimes
- The Costa Rican exception and authoritarian development
    - Building the Costa Rican oasis
    - Anticommunist authoritarianism
        - Nicaragua: “Our son of a bitch”
        - Circling the square: Nasserism, development and agro-exporter dominance in El Salvador
        - Guatemala: building a counter-insurgent State
- The model’s crisis
- The Central American processes: revolution, war, democracy and peace

IV.- State building in Central America: an approach to actors

- The US and the International Community
- The socioeconomic structure of Central American societies
- The agro-exporter elites
- The Armed Forces
- Social groups and alternative structures
    - Political parties
    - Social organisations
    - Revolutionary movements
- The indigenous peoples

V.- Democracy, State and development in Central America: the fruits of peace and the future challenges

- The fruits of peace and the transformation of the State
- From elections to citizenship and social democracy in the era of globalization. State building and the challenges of the future
    - The consolidation of political systems
        - Intermediate structures and party systems
        - Political culture
    - State challenges
    - Socioeconomic structure and challenges
    - International position in the era of globalization
    - Central American integration

VI. The Spirit of San José and the future of EU's policy vis-à-vis Central America

VII.- Conclusions

BUILDING VIABLE STATES

Lessons and challenges of the process of State construction in Central America♦

Manuel Montobbio♣

♦ This essay was presented as a contribution to the International Expert Forum's "Precarious States and International Order", organized by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Planning Office of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the author participated at the proposal of the Toledo International Centre for Peace. The Centre acknowledges the Bertelsmann Foundation's consent to issue this publication.

♣ Manuel Montobbio, currently Ambassador at large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain, is a Spanish career diplomat with a doctoral degree in Political Science. His professional life has been closely linked to Spain's participation in the Central American peace processes; he is the author of *La metamorfosis del Pulgarcito. Transición política y proceso de paz en El Salvador* (Barcelona, Icaria-FLACSO, 1999) and numerous publications on the Central American political processes. The views expressed in t this essay are those of the author.

I.- INTRODUCTION: Preliminary considerations

Any comprehensive analysis of the viability and precariousness of the State in Central America should take into account both general conditioning factors as well as factors that are specific to Central America.

In Central America, as in other cases, the State's capacity to provide security and to ensure the rule of law and the welfare of its citizens determines its viability or precariousness. In Central America, however, there are unique factors and issues that condition the State's viability, as explained below.

- Who are we? The answer to this question, the sense of community, of a shared citizenship in a common State with a common project for survival and future, conditions the viability of the State. When such a sense exists, it strengthens the State's legitimacy. When, on the contrary, different groups within the State think of themselves as a "we" who does not consider a wider one, and the dominant group sees the State as a mere tool for the protection of its own interests, used to control other groups or shape society as a whole, State legitimacy is weakened and its viability negatively conditioned. The wider "we" encompassing all citizens can be and is built by the State, but its prior existence also determines the State's building process and viability. There can indeed be -in fact, there are- different communities and "we" within the State, but a sense of an overarching community, a common "we" of nationhood that is shared by all citizens, is inherent to the State's legitimacy and viability.

- State viability is determined by its legitimacy, its sense of community, the democratic origin of its authorities, as well as by its effectiveness: citizens want the State not only to guarantee security and rule of law, but also to promote policies that satisfy their fundamental human needs. As noted in the UNDP's Report *The State of Democracy in Latin America*, it is not only a matter of electoral democracy, but of full citizenship and social democracy as well.

- Other conditioning factors stem from the structure and institutionality of the State and the political system on which it is based (its constitutional engineering, in Giovanni Sartori's terminology).

- The culture, the *Weltanschaaung* –in Wittgenstein's terminology– or world view, shared values and common points of reference within society and the traditional way of solving problems and with zero or positive game approaches.

- Its international insertion and the leeway provided by the International system and agenda for the State elected authorities to promote a true national agenda that is not merely the execution of international or foreign agendas. The viability of a national agenda and the capacity to be heard in international forums and by actors which determine or influence it.

Taking all these elements into consideration, how should we approach the analysis of State's viability and State building in Central America? It is a process influenced by history and various factors and actors. In order to do this effectively, I propose the following road map or intellectual trip.

- A consideration of geography, demography and history for State building in Central America, as factors and legacies from pre-Columbian, Spanish and Independence periods.

- A comparative approach to State building processes in Central America, from independence to the Central American crises and peace processes, considering different periods, models and crises.

- An approach to actors.

- A survey of the fruits of peace and future challenges, particularly as they relate to State formation, democracy and development in Central America.

- The challenges and possibilities of the International Community –specially for the EU in the spirit of San José- in relation to its contribution to State building in Central America.

- An attempt of conclusions.

Let's go.

II.- GEOGRAPHY, DEMOGRAPHY AND HISTORY. FACTORS AND LEGACIES FOR STATE BUILDING IN CENTRAL AMERICA[1]

The pre-Columbian legacy

Geography. As an Isthmus between North and South America and the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, Central America's geo-strategic position has been a permanent structural conditioning factor throughout its history. The first Spanish Monarchs after the conquest, Charles the V and Phillip the II (Rouquié, 1994: 21) had already regarded the region as a strategic bridge and the potential site for linking the two oceans. Central America's geography has continued to elicit the interests of international powers since its integration into the international system.

Population. The region's terrain, characterized by a chain of mountains and volcanoes on the Pacific side, has also conditioned population distribution since pre-Columbian times: population is densely concentrated in the Guatemalan high plateau and in the fertile Salvadoran volcanic lands, largely dispersed in the rest of the territory, and scarce in Costa Rica and the Atlantic Coast.

In contrast with the Aztec and Inca Empires conquered by the Spaniards in Mexico and South America, the Mayan civilization was not a unified Empire, but rather, a loosely linked system of city States with no common authority. It occupied the Northern part of the region, while other indigenous groups and cultures inhabited the rest of the territory. Therefore, Central America did not exist culturally and linguistically before the Spanish presence, as reflected by the fact that there were twenty three different indigenous languages in Guatemala. Each community had its own language. There was no tradition of belonging to the same political unit or a larger community.

The Spanish legacy

Central America did not play a central role in the Spanish American Empire. It did not possess riches and resources other than its land and its population. After conquering its territory, Pedro de Alvarado went to Peru to look for gold and wealth. Colonial Administration was established in the form of a General Captaincy between the viceroyalties of New Spain (México) and Peru, linking them to defend the territorial unity of the Empire; and extending its general administrative model.

[1] For the purposes of this essay, Central America comprises the former United Central American Provinces emerging from the Spanish General Captaincy of Guatemala and including the current territories of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The Mexican State of Chiapas also belonged to the General Captaincy of Guatemala, and has a similar structure and the same indigenous groups as Guatemala. Having been part of Agustín de Iturbide Mexican Empire as the rest of Central America, Chiapas would decide by popular referendum to remain with Mexico upon the demise of the Empire in 1824.

This model implied the early creation of municipalities, judiciary and other powers and institutions, including San Carlos University, the third to be established in America. It also entailed the extension of laws and rules as well as the Crown's recognition of indigenous lands and laws. In practice, the system worked in an equilibrium among the Crown and its administrators, tasked with applying the law and collecting taxes; the local elites of Spanish origin, engaging in export-oriented agrarian production as their main economic activity; and the indigenous peoples, neither integrating nor participating in the new regime, secluded in their communal lands and under their own laws as guaranteed by the Crown.

Evangelization was a central purpose of the conquest, and a shared Catholic faith is one of the legacies of the Spanish presence. As for the indigenous peoples, many of their traditional beliefs persisted under Christian disguise, in what is known as syncretism. Spanish priests learned indigenous languages in order to transmit the Christian faith, and one of them found and translated into Spanish the *Popol Vuh*[2] at the beginning of the 18th century. Just after the conquest, Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas was an outspoken advocate of the indigenous peoples and their human condition, eliciting their recognition by the Crown.

Even though indigenous languages are still spoken, Spanish is the common language shared by all inhabitants of the region, as in the rest of the former Spanish American Empire.

The socioeconomic structure was dominated by elites of Spanish origin dedicated to export-oriented agrarian production, with a tendency to produce a single crop responsive to the demands of the international market (cotton, indigo, coffee…). In populated areas, they tried "encomiendas" and used cheap indigenous or mestizo labour to exploit large properties. In less populated areas, especially in Costa Rica, farmers of European descent exploited small and medium size properties by themselves and with their families. Although the region was governed by the Spanish Administration from Guatemala, the established elites tended to organize themselves locally. Economically, two poles of activity would soon emerge: the North Pacific (from Chiapas to North Nicaragua) and the South (from Costa Rica to South Nicaragua). Another pole would emerge later in the Caribbean under British presence.

As for the indigenous peoples, "no integration no participation" could be the formula that best describes their situation. They were Christianized and participated partially in the economic process; the Crown granted them communal lands, and recognized their own laws and authorities. To a large extent, their culture and languages were preserved as was their sense of community, with no reference to a sense of a wider community shared with newcomers.

Gradually, a British presence was established in the Caribbean, mainly from pirate origin, especially in Belize and Nicaragua. Although not politically

[2] Mayan holy book on the origins of the world.

recognized by Spain, the British presence imported slaves from Africa. This resulted in the emergence of a third economic pole.

In a territory where different "we's" ignored each other, the Church and the Crown's Administration constituted the key external cohesion makers for all communities coexisting in a single political space. Is the need of an external cohesion maker part of the historical legacy of Central America? No matter how we answer this question, the disappearance of the Crown gave rise to tensions among local interested parties and the idea of a common political Central American entity and identity. The legacy of a common political and administrative past was also left behind, as was the myth and heritage of Central American unity.

The legacy of Independence

As Enrique Krauze said referring to Mexico's independence, "the conquest was made by the Indians and independence by the Spaniards". Central America is not an exception to the general phenomena of Spanish American independence's processes and could not be understood outside of this framework. It was a process whose seeds should be sought in the penetration of Enlightenment ideas among Spaniards in both hemispheres. It led to the proclamation in 1812, at Cadiz during Napoleon's siege, of a liberal Constitution in whose elaboration representatives of the American territories also took part, establishing citizenship for "Spaniards from both hemispheres". The Constitution did not come into force until 1820. It was then that General Riego was commissioned in command of an Army to America to suppress the pro-independence liberal revolts. The rebels, however, were fighting for the very political ideas Riego shared. In a unique case in colonial History, Riego refused to embark with his troops, returned to Madrid and led a coup d'etat that imposed the 1812 Constitution on the absolutist King Ferdinand VII. The new political ideas had already been adopted as their own by the Spanish American elites during the 18th century. These elites would lead the fight for independence from Spain when its territory was occupied by Napoleon, as exemplified by Hidalgo´s rebellion in 1810 and the struggle against the absolutist regime of Ferdinand VII in 1821.

Central American independence came about in the wake of Mexican independence and cannot be understood without it. It was proclaimed on the 15th September 1821 in Mexico and on the 16th in Central America, although only a month later would the news be known in Costa Rica (Rouquié, 1994: 31). Central America would be part of Agustín de Iturbide's Empire until its extinction, giving way to the Central American United Provinces, which would be torn apart by civil strife between Morazán's liberal federalists and conservative local elites. Morazán's defeat in 1838 would put an end to the Federation and lead to the emergence of the five independent republics, leaving behind forever the memory and the myth of Central American unity. As Alain Rouquié points out, Central America became "a single Nation into five States".

Central America, no doubt, became independent from Spain, but to some extent also from Mexico and from itself. On the one hand, its independence process would leave behind the legacy of the tension between federalism and unity and the wish of local elites to have states they could control and the reality of familiar interaction in Central American politics[3]. On the other hand, it would mark the predominance of ideological or partisan notions of narrower "we" at the expense of a wider or more inclusive sense of community and statehood. To a large extent, rather than a national and collective project, independence was the result of the projects of local elites in pursuit of their own interests. The disappearance of the external cohesion-maker brought about the emergence of States through which to promote a socio-economic model based on the elites' specific interests, as in the Gattopardo's famous scene: "We need that everything changes so that everything remains the same". The project could have been different: one rooted in an Enlightenment dream of creating a federation based on inclusiveness and citizenship for all.

[3] Central American politics would be dominated by some Presidents' ambitions to control the regional scene, in some cases with federal ambitions. Marco Aurelio Soto, President of Honduras (1876-1883), had been Guatemala's President Rufino Barrios Finance Minister. At the beginning of the XXth century, liberal Nicaraguan President Zelaya would push for federal movements and try to influence the policies of his neighbours.

III. - INTERCONNECTED WAYS: A COMPARED APPROACH TO STATE BUILDING PROCESSES IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Having in practice excluded the federal option, State building processes in Central America would take place in parallel but interconnected ways. Although every State has its own specificities, this analysis will try to focus on the common elements and general trends, as well as on the progressive construction of the Costa Rican exception, concentrating on Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, which would become intertwined in the Central American crises of the 1980s and the peace processes of the 1990s.

Building agro-exporter republics.

Once on their way to independence, political life in the Central American republics would be characterized by political competition between conservative and liberal parties and factions. The Army became a central political actor used by civilian politicians as a tool for political change. A socioeconomic model based on export-oriented agriculture developed, through which the elites promoted capital accumulation and insertion in the international economy. By the end of the 19th century the republics had established constitutional regimes with limited suffrage, where conservatives and liberals succeed each other in power, often controlled by strong political figures. The modernization process lead gave rise to coffee (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica) or banana (Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica) republics; to an export-oriented economy supported by investment in infrastructures and railways – and to the economic and political presence and influence of foreign actors. The United Kingdom's influence was gradually replaced by that of the United States; and the Spanish Crown's protection system for the indigenous peoples was dismantled in the name of liberalism through the privatization of communal lands for export-oriented production and the abolition of indigenous laws. Indigenous people were placed under common law and many joined the labour force of export-oriented production.

Substantial differences also appeared in each republic. In Guatemala, local elites (and European immigration, mainly of German origin), concentrated in coffee production, sharing economic power with the ever-growing Banana Fruit Company. Guatemala was the only country in Central America with a majority indigenous population. In El Salvador, local elites, of which European immigrants became part, would take control of agrarian export-oriented production, mainly coffee. Honduras' economic development and history would, to a large extent, become a creature of the octopus, as the Banana Fruit Company got to be known. Nicaragua's history was determined by its geographical location as a bridge or road between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Passage through its lakes was the favoured way to send merchandises from the US East Coast to California before the Far West was conquered. Foreign powers viewed Nicaragua as an ideal site to build an inter-oceanic channel (and, once it was built in Panama, a place to be kept under control to avoid the construction of an alternative channel). The UK, with its strong connections to the Miskito population, would be substituted by the US, beginning with Nicaragua's occupation by the American adventurer William Walker from 1855 until 1857. Costa Rica would also witness a growing production of coffee and bananas, but due to its population shortage and the better conditions offered by the BFC to attract workers, would eventually foster mid-sized family coffee producers, and their organization in powerful trade unions.

Crisis of the agro-exporter model, mass rebellion and emergence of military regimes.

The early 20th century is the time the Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset has considered the period of "the rebellion of the masses": the time of the Soviet and the Mexican Revolution, which would have a lasting influence in Latin America and in the region. Somehow, the system's success creates the actors and conditions that question its permanence. Export-oriented agricultural production required companies with high concentration of workers, as well as infrastructure construction and other industries. This created a worker's class that organized trade unions, giving rise to a society where other political options, including the Communist Party, would emerge as alternatives to the traditional conservative and liberal parties. Also within the elites, an emerging industrialization process would create groups trying to dispute supremacy over the traditional agriculture-oriented dominant sector.

The international economic crisis of 1929 will stand in Central America not only as an economic crisis, but also as a crisis of the model as a whole, with attempts to open the system, give room for and integrate the new forces and actors. These attempts would eventually result in the establishment of military authoritarian regimes.

The window of opportunity of this political spring would start in El Salvador in 1931 with its first open and democratic elections, won by Arturo Araujo´s Labour Party, which promoted social reforms inspired by social thinker Alberto Masferrer. A peasant uprising in the North supported by Farabundo Martí's Communist Party was brutally suppressed by Vice President General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, giving way to a series of authoritarian military regimes. The repression would result in the killing of a 4% of the population, mainly indigenous peasants, and the disappearance of expressions of indigenous culture; and it would leave a profound collective trauma. In poet Roque Dalton's words, "we were all born half dead in 1932".

From 1944 till 1954 Guatemala would go through its own political "Guatemalan Spring" during the presidencies of Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz, when social and labour laws were promoted with the support of the Guatemalan Workers Party. Arbenz's intention to expropriate part of the UBC's lands and the Cold War atmosphere of the time would bring the Guatemalan spring to an abrupt end, and a military coup supported by the US ushered in a long winter of authoritarian military regimes.

Occupied by the US since 1910, Nicaragua would be the country of César Augusto Sandino's fight, the origin of a Latin American myth that would end with the substitution of American troops by the National Guard they had created. The accession to the Presidency of Anastasio Somoza, the Guard's Chief, would inaugurate a "dynasty" in power.

With the exception of Costa Rica, the windows of opportunity opened by the "rebellion of the masses" would be shut close by authoritarian military regimes trying to attain political stability through a new model. Economic elites from the agriculture sector managed to regain control at the price of yielding the running of the political system to the military and of relying on them for the preservation of their privileged position.

Costa Rica's exception and authoritarian development

Building the Costa Rican oasis. Costa Rica would respond to the crisis of the 1930s by instituting reformist policies, especially during the presidency of Calderón Guardia (1940-1944), a Christian reformist allied with the Communist Party and supported by the Church, and his successor Teodoro Picado (1944-1948). The contention of 1948 led to a brief civil strife conducted by José Figueres and his National Liberation Army ("Legión Caribe"), and a subsequent Constituent Assembly that reshaped the political system, dismantling both armies and declaring Costa Rica a demilitarized State. The country turned to the model of welfare State, with large investments in education and social policies, partly financed through savings in military spending.

Anticommunist authoritarianisms. In the Cold War environment, as Kennedy's Alliance for Progress sought to promote development for Latin America and as populism and revolution became the key words of Latin American politics, military authoritarian regimes undertook policies to institutionalize and enforce stability. They did so through promotion of economic development, both in domestic policies and through the creation of the Central American Common Market, inspired by import-substitution industrial policies. Anticommunist political rhetoric and strong support from the US to friendly regimes - intended to avoid "another Cuba"- contributed to the viability of this model.

A model, however, with its own nuances and differences in each case. In Nicaragua, Somoza's dynasty and the security structures had total control. The case has been mentioned as an example of sultanistic regime by political scientists, to the extent that a large part of traditional elites distanced themselves from the government. Repression and a very close alliance with the US would guarantee the regime's viability for decades; a regime founded by a man who once said "Nicaragua is my farm" (LaFeber, 1989: 208), of whom an American observer said "He is a son of a bitch; but he is our son of a bitch".

In El Salvador, the more personalistic regime of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez was replaced, after the 1948 revolution, by military attempts to institutionalize and legitimate regimes with an official civilian party that left room for limited activity of opposition parties, mainly the Christian Democrats, who would win the Government of the municipality of San Salvador and promote development policies. Interrupted by a new revolutionary Junta, the regime would be redefined with the National Conciliation Party as the official party (which remains today the third party in Salvadoran politics, a unique case of skilful civilian politicians coming from the official party of a military regime) Yet this "Nasserism" would reveal its limitations when the dominance of agriculture export-oriented elites was placed under threat.

Guatemala established "a counter-insurgent State without an insurgency", in Edelberto Torres-Rivas´ words. An insurgent movement emerged, founded by the military officers who in 1960 had failed to re-establish the constitutional regime of 1944 through a coup d'état.

The model's crisis

In the 1970s the model got in crisis. The "football war" between El Salvador and Honduras ended in practice meant the end of the Central American Common Market. In 1972 democratic opposition won the presidential elections in El Salvador, but their victory was not recognized and the military candidate of the official party was proclaimed the winner instead. Once in power, colonel Molina pushed for agrarian reform, an attempt that was frustrated by the economic elites. After the failure of loyal opposition to change the system from within, revolutionary forces tried to promote change through violence. On the government side, repression became the only way to stay in power. The international economic oil crisis of 1973 left the regimes without the legitimating asset of economic growth. In the case of Nicaragua, this was worsened by the 1972 earthquake. Carter's human rights policy isolated these regimes and showed that US support could not be taken for granted. Repression and insurgence fed each other. On 19 July 1979, the entrance of the Sandinistas in Managua signalled the demise of the model and the beginning of a new era in the region.

The Central American processes: revolution, war, democracy and peace

The "coup of the captains" of 15th October 1979 in El Salvador and the "burnt land" offensive against guerrillas in Guatemala introduced the phase called the Central American crisis, which developed at three levels: in the armed civil confrontations in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala; as a regional stage for the global East-West confrontation; and as a stage for the low-intensity war approach promoted by the US, which led to a regionalization of a conflict in which the Sandinista Government and the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas were confronted by the Governments and armed forces of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, as well as the Government of Costa Rica.

A complete analysis of the Central American processes[4] goes beyond the intention and limits of this essay. But both the "how" and the "what" of the Central American process and its results need to be taken into account. A "how" in which the low-intensity war approach promoted by the US, which sought a military solution, was successfully confronted by the negotiated alternative proposed by regional Latin American states in the Contadora Group with the support of the European Union and the United Nations. Although Contadora did not succeed, it created a space for negotiations among the five Central American governments that led to the signing of the Esquipulas II Agreements, a turning point in attempts to seek the negotiated solution of the crises, which would lay the foundation for peace in Nicaragua. This in turn created an environment for the adoption of frameworks for peace negotiations both in El Salvador and in Guatemala, that mediated by the UN with the support of a Group of Friends. Negotiations culminated in the Peace Agreements of 1992 and 1996 and their implementation under UN verification and peace building missions.

This "how" is part of the "what" enabled by the agreements and their implementation. The accords have a foundational character in terms of nation building, constituting the first occasion in which all relevant sectors of Central American societies with the support of the international community defined a common project for the future. A "what" politically constituted by democratic systems that would forever substitute the old authoritarian regimes and their revolutionary alternatives, and by a new tradition of negotiation and mobilization. Furthermore, structural limitations to democratic transition in Nicaragua and El Salvador were overcome through agrarian reforms which reduced the influence of export-oriented agriculture as the main source of power for economic elites. Yet, tax reform is still to be done in Guatemala.[5]

[4] See Montobbio (1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2001b, 2002).

[5] Somehow, the processes in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala have influenced each other, and seek to contain each other's evolution. In El Salvador the young military led a coup and made an alliance with the Christian Democrat opposition to avoid a revolutionary triumph similar to the one in Nicaragua. As noted by Edelberto Torres-Rivas, while the agrarian reform made by the Sandinistas in power transferred 27% of land property, the one apply by the Christian Democrats in El Salvador transferred 28%. In Guatemala, the ruling military promoted the transition to a Constitutional Assembly which established a democratic regime and a civilian President without any substantial socioeconomic reform. The implementation of the Peace Agreements was conditioned by the negative result of the 1999 referendum on constitutional reform. Peace has so far not meant the land and tax reforms needed for socioeconomic transformation.

IV.- STATE BUILDING IN CENTRAL AMERICA: AN APPROACH TO ACTORS

The US and the International Community

More than any other region, Central America has historically been considered essential to the US national interest, a region whose stability and international insertion have a direct impact on the security of the United States to the extent that it has often been called its "backyard". While the US initial objectives in the region were limited to avoiding "another Mexico" (thus not supporting federalist trends) and ensuring inter-oceanic communication, they gradually increased their presence, substituting the UK as the main economic foreign power. The US would eventually turn into the main international actor in Central America, which would decisively determine the five republics´ international insertion. Furthermore, the US became an essential internal actor, without whom national politics and socioeconomic models – shaped according to US interest - could not be understood. The Central American crisis, seen by the US as an expression of the East-West confrontation, provoked the deepest involvement of the US in the region within the framework of its low intensity conflict approach – to avoid another Cuba without entering into another Vietnam. The US thus became an essential actor in a confrontation which would not be resolved as initially envisioned by the US, but rather through peace negotiations. Starting from the turning point of Esquipulas II, the US turned into an essential actor of peace as can be seen from its decisive association to the Salvadoran peace negotiations, thereby assuming the need to establish a political and socioeconomic system acceptable to all national actors[6].

If war is influenced by external actors and factors, so is peace. Starting with Contadora, a Latin American initiative to solve a Latin American problem that created a new dynamic in articulating the international order in Latin America, and then with Esquipulas, external actors would take up a key role in the peace negotiations, the implementation of the agreements and the substantial transformation of Central America. They would include the United Nations, the Group of Friends, the European Union and the International Community as a whole.

Peace was regional peace. Stemming from the space created by Contadora, it was achieved by the five Central American governments in Esquipulas II. And because it had a regional dimension, it opened the way to a new dynamic of regional integration and political coordination.

National or internal actors have assumed this prominent role played by the US and the International Community as essential to their national life. In addition to having been decisive allies in national confrontations, their role was that of intermediaries, providers of confidence building measures, key cooperation partners, and even external cohesion makers.

[6] For a complete analysis of US visions and policies towards Central America, see Montobbio, 1999: 73-126.

The end of war presented a challenge to both international and national actors: that of deepening their engagement in cooperation for positive peace consolidation, which means democracy and sustainable development; as well as, ultimately, the overcoming of State's precariousness and the consolidation of its viability.

The Central American actors

The socioeconomic structure of Central American countries decisively conditions the viability of Central American States. Edelberto Torres-Rivas compares Guatemala's social structure to a five-floor building, in which the 11.4 million Guatemalans live. An 18% of the population lives in the second basement earning just 0.49 USD a day (of which 78% is in the informal sector, 75% rural, 71% indigenous, 54% under 15 years of age, 43% illiterate, 0.8 year education), and possessing no real possibilities to move upwards. In basement one, 49.4% live with a bit more than one USD a day (51.1% ladinos, 48.9% indigenous; 48% rural; 73% in the informal sector; 20% illiterate; 2.5 years education) with a greater likelihood of moving down rather than up. On the first floor, 22.5% live with 2.64 USD a day (20.5% indigenous, 98% literate, 36% under 15, 6.2 years education), 35% of all public employees and teachers. In the second, 7.8% live with 6.50 USD a day (9.5% rural, 6.8% indigenous, 29% under 15, all literate, 11 years education). In the penthouse, 1.5% live with 19.48 USD a day, 384 times more than those in basement two (0.7% indigenous, all literate and many bilingual, with an average of 14.3 years education). What kind of State can be viable with such social structure? Can a State like that be seen as legitimate and shared by all the inhabitants of the building without promoting policies that aim to transform this unbalanced structure?.

Within Central American societies, the agro-exporter elites have played a decisive role in shaping the socioeconomic models and political systems, and have traditionally controlled and influenced the State to preserve the *status quo*. Agrarian and social reforms in the processes in Nicaragua and El Salvador have transformed the support basis of the economic elites, which became less dependent on agro-export. This shift contributed to their acceptance of democracy (where they have learnt to compete very effectively, as seen from the case of ARENA in El Salvador) and of the global economy. This is a transformation which to a large extent is yet to be achieved in Guatemala.

Are the Armed Forces a cause or a consequence of the state of the State and its evolution in Central America? The armed forces constitute a central actor in State's origin, a key player in its shaping, as well as a victim of a political and social culture based on imposition and use of violence and a result of the absence of other effective State structures. The answer to the question above could be both. Currently, however, the Central American Armed Forces have been substantially transformed as a result of the peace processes while other State structures have been reinforced. As a consequence, the military are no longer the central political actor, nor are they obstacles to State's viability in the region.

Social groups and intermediary structures. Authoritarianism and the closure of political spaces altered the normal role of intermediary structures – political parties and social organizations -. Doors closed to loyal opposition led to the emergence of revolutionary movements with political and military structures. Violence from the opposition constituted a means of political action, and was also used in response to the illegitimate use of violence from the State. War became the main political game. “Façade” actors and substitute mechanisms entered into political life under a legal cover. Since certain political options were not allowed to exist as legal political parties, they used the cover of social organizations, NGOs and other options to act in or influence legal political life. Once the revolutionary movements have transformed themselves into political parties and all political options have been given the chance to participate and compete in fair conditions, the challenge to the viability of the State and the political system is to ensure that the new political parties behaved as such (and not as revolutionary movements); and social organizations and NGOs as social organizations and NGOs - and not as substitutes for political parties with no legal standing -, thereby fully assuming their declared role in an effective and legitimate way.

The viability of the State in Central America faces as a crucial test the challenge of overcoming the traditional scheme of “no integration no participation” of indigenous peoples, promoting the legal and policy reforms required to ensure their full exercise of citizenship and the protection of their cultural rights. It is a challenge that goes both ways: indigenous peoples will also have to take it upon themselves to assume their share of responsibility in a State that has traditionally been the preserve of the others. Physically and culturally suppressed in 1932 in El Salvador, only in Guatemala do the indigenous people still constitute the majority of the population, a difference that singles out this country from the other in the region. Despite the negative result of the referendum on constitutional reforms laid down by the peace agreements, including the definition of Guatemala as a pluricultural, multilingual and multiethnic nation, the agreements have placed indigenous demands on the political agenda, and indigenous communities are increasingly organized in the social and political realms.

V.- DEMOCRACY, STATE AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE FRUITS OF PEACE AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE

Which are the fruits of peace? What is there now that was not there before? What does the metamorphosis of the pre 1979 Central America consist of? What do these transformations mean for State viability and what challenges does the State face? Let's try to answer these questions with the following considerations.

- The main fruit of peace is neither a revolution, nor the maintenance of a new form of authoritarianism, nor a radical socioeconomic transformation. It is instead a new political regime which can be classified as democratic. The reforms effected during the Central American processes and the contents of *the peace agreements and their implementation have essentially led to:*

    - The *demilitarization* of Central American States and societies, through a substantial transformation of military missions, which were limited to national defence, and the adoption of a new doctrine, education and procedures for the Armed Forces, as well as the separation of security forces from the military.

    - *A substantial transformation of the State and the political system* through new institutions and rules of the political game: new constitutions and democratically and competitively elected Parliaments and State authorities; reformed judicial powers; new Ombudsmen and mechanisms for the protection of human rights; new Civilian National Police; transformed electoral authorities and rules that open the way to participation by all political options and actors and their acceptance by all.

    - *Some socioeconomic reforms,* especially as regards land and agrarian matters, both issues that stood in the way of democracy in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

    - *Guatemala* is to a large extent *an exception*, where more remains to be done. With no agrarian reform and a substantially unaltered socioeconomic structure, the failure of the 1999 referendum on constitutional reforms introduced by the peace agreements has prevented the adoption of some crucial legal and institutional reforms. Pending fiscal reform[7] deprives the State of the necessary resources to fully implement the socioeconomic policies proposed by the agreements to meet the needs of all citizens and transform the existing socioeconomic structure. All of this conditions the State's viability.

[7]The peace agreements proposed to pass tax pressure from 7% to 12% of GDP. This would be a little more than half the rate applied in other Central American Sates.

- As already noted, the peace processes have left behind the intangible legacy of the way they were achieved. The agreements are a turning point in Central American History, and show the possibility of a State defined by all relevant actors in Central American societies; the possibility to build Central American History by Central American actors, and to solve political conflict through political means, negotiation and consensus. The new regimes are not only the result of a political transition, but also, to some extent, of a founding social contract that had been absent (especially in Nicaragua) at the time of nation building after independence.

- Is democracy consolidated? To answer this question we should distinguish between political regime and political system. *While the new democratic regimes can be considered consolidated, the political systems are still in the process of consolidation*, since in addition to the political regime, they also depend on yet evolving intermediary structures and political cultures

  Emerging, as previously mentioned, from a period of substitute mechanisms, *intermediary structures, specially the political party system*, are yet in evolution towards a definitive or stable model. Nicaragua is undergoing a period where political life is being held hostage to the fight between the two main parties, a situation which severely undermines the functioning of democracy and of political party life. Both the FSLN and the FMLN face the challenge of generational change and need to go beyond the legitimacy and leadership derived from the armed struggle, while Guatemala faces the challenge of articulating a solid and competitive option on the left of the political spectrum. In El Salvador ARENA's capacity to stay in power should be noted: it is an almost unique case in Latin America of a party winning four successive competitive presidential elections. Also of note is the PCN's ability to survive and adapt to changing circumstances. The final structure of the party system will be determined by the emergence of a competitive option on the centre and the evolution of the FMLN. Guatemala, where .no party has ever won two successive presidential elections or kept legislative majority, faces the challenge to turn political parties into more than platforms to run for elections, and to transform them, with some exceptions, into real and effective intermediary structures, as well as that of building a stable party system.

  - How long does it take to transform an authoritarian *political culture* into a democratic one? Most studies note that it may require generations. In Central America, studies show progress in democratic values and attitudes on one hand, and the persistence of authoritarian tendencies on the other. The recourse to violence or the primary identification with social groups within the citizenship are structural traits of the Central American political culture that need to be overcome, as shown in the "maras" phenomenon. A culture based on rights and citizenship needs to be strengthened: a positive sum game approach should replace the zero sum game that prevails in overall social relations and political life.

- Transitions are not to democracy per se, but rather *to a certain kind of democracy*. In the case of the Central American processes, there have been transitions to electoral democracy, a characterization that follows UNDP's distinction in its Report on the State of Democracy in Latin America. Political and electoral rights are in force; civil and social rights have yet to go from paper to reality. Even if citizenship and social democracy is still to be fully achieved, peace processes have nonetheless broken the vicious circle that impeded this goal. They have done so by overcoming structural limitations to democratic transition and by establishing political and electoral democracy. From this platform, and using the rights and possibilities it offers, it is possible to undertake the collective task of making further progress to achieve full citizenship and social democracy.

- To a large extent, Central American States share many of their present problems and challenges with other Latin American States. Whether "normal" or specific, these are <u>some of the problems and challenges of the State in Central America, that still condition its viability</u>[8]:

    - *Absence of monopoly of violence*. There is no longer an alternative to the State's legitimate recourse to force by organizations with political objectives, but an alternative source of violence has emerged. In Guatemala, lynchings reflect a trend to pay violence with violence and take justice in one's own hands. "Maras", which are both social structures and criminal groups, are a threat to social life as a whole.

    - Central American States are anaemic States which lack the resources required to implement public policies that ensure civil and social rights. They remain heavily conditioned by the international agenda (symbolized by the Washington consensus) and have limited national political options. Citizens want their States to be not only democratic but efficient and satisfy their needs. In the long run, both fiscal reform –especially in Guatemala– and education policies will be crucial for State's viability. The former promotes redistribution and gives the State sufficient resources, while the latter is decisive for development, political culture transformation and citizenship empowerment.

    - Central American political systems face *challenges of "constitutional engineering"* – in Giovanni Sartori's terminology. On one hand, Executive Power has traditionally overshadowed Legislative and Judicial powers. These should be strengthened to ensure a more equitable balance. Some experts propose a move away from presidentialism in Latin American political systems to parliamentarism or semipresidentialism. On the other hand, the transformation of the constitutional State should be followed by *the development of an administrative State*, underpinned by a professional and efficient Administration that is able to implement effective policies beyond political change.

[8] For a complete vision of the challenges faced by the State and political system in El Salvador, see Montobbio (2004).

- As stated at the beginning and throughout this essay, the sense of nationhood or political community, of *a common "we"* shared by all citizens of the State is a key factor for its viability, for a social contract based on citizens' equal rights in relation to the State. A sense in whose construction substantive advancements, as well as the positive contribution of the peace agreements in that respect, are to be pointed out; but for whose fulfilment, especially in relation to the indigenous peoples, some way is yet to be travelled.

- State's viability depends not only on the State itself, but also on the society on which it is based, its structure and evolution. Edelberto Torres-Rivas five-floor building description of Guatemalan social structure reminds us that *the transformation of Central American social architecture* is not only a main challenge for the State, but a key issue for its viability as well. Indigenous peoples and women appear as decisive objectives and crucial actors of these transformations. *Emigration,* especially to the US, has become a structural factor of Central American societies and economies (and of their cultural evolution), that needs to be factored in when looking into their transformation and future. While six million Salvadorans live in their country, almost two million live in the US. Remittances from abroad are the main source of foreign income of the Salvadoran economy, beyond the proceeds from coffee exports,. Migration tips the balance of economic deficits and makes the socioeconomic model viable. The impact of the migrant population and the principle that citizens have a right to live and support themselves in their own country should not be ignored when designing policies for future development and transformation.

- Finally, the viability of the State in the era of globalization also depends on its international position. The US, the EU, Latin America and the Pacific Basin should be seen as the points of destination of an internationalization effort crucial to development: a challenge not only for the State, but also for society as a whole, especially its business sector. It is an effort that can be undertaken regionally or individually, following the model of MERCOSUR (integration and negotiation as a group of international insertion) or Mexico's NAFTA model (individual negotiation of a free trade agreements with the US and Canada, as well as with the EU), in a progressive build-up of the America's Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) promoted by the US in an era of great regional economic blocks. Regional integration has thus become the essential political and economic option for Central American States, from which their viability and international insertion can be pursued, increasing their political and economic leeway and their relative autonomy and negotiating capability. International insertion depends not only on the way international actors play the international game, but also on the rules of the game. The question arises of whether these rules, and especially the Washington consensus, benefit State viability, or alternatively whether they should be transformed for that purpose.

VI. - THE SPIRIT OF SAN JOSÉ AND THE FUTURE OF EU'S POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL AMERICA

Looking back, it can be said that the European Union did not have a policy for Central America and was not a significant international actor in the region. The Central American crisis, and especially the emergence of an alternative of negotiated solution to the crisis from Contadora, among other factors such as political parties international politics and Spain and Portugal joining the EU, led to the establishment of the San José Conference in 1984. The Conference brought together the EU, Central America and the Foreign Ministers of Contadora, establishing what has subsequently been known as the San José Process. European political engagement with peace-building in Central America led to strong development cooperation, converting the region into the first per capita recipient of EU aid[9].

Meeting yearly at the ministerial level during the first years – itself a proof of EU engagement – three phases of the Process evolution can be outlined: from San José I to III, the mechanism sought to support efforts to achieve a negotiated solution through Contadora or Esquipulas; from San José IV to VI, it articulated the political support and cooperation for the implementation of Esquipulas II; and in its third phase it concentrated on supporting and providing cooperation to the processes in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as responding to emergency needs caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. By its tenth anniversary and considering its achievements, a revision of the process was undertaken. This led to reshaping the framework of San José in 1996 at its X Conference, held in Florence. While reaffirming its engagement to peace building, development and democracy in the region, the *Florence Declaration* changed the framework to hold biannual full ministerial meetings, as well as EU troika and Central American ministers' meetings. Once the highest diplomatic EU-Latin America forum, the San José Process is currently incorporated within EU-Latin America relations, in which the EU-Latin America and Caribbean Heads of State and Government Summits and the EU-Río Group ministerial meetings play a key role. To a certain extent, San José launched a dynamic of interregional relations which has surpassed its initial centrality.

Looking forward, Central America and EU-Central American relations face the challenge of not becoming the victims of their own successes: transforming their support to build negative peace into support for building positive peace, meaning democracy, sustainable development and positive cultural interaction in an environment of cultural diversity. The challenge -in Johan Galtung's terms- of going from direct to structural and cultural peace.

Central America is not, and is not likely to become again, the place where "to draw the line" in a global confrontation, as Alexander Haig once said. If given sufficient attention, the region should elicit the continued engagement of international actors thus reinforcing the viability of its States and society. This would not be due to strategic considerations, but a

[9] For a complete vision on EU policy to Central America, see Montobbio, 2000 and 2001a.

recognition of their commitment to peace-building, democracy and sustainable development - with State viability - around the World. If the EU wants to be a global constructive power, a peace-builder and a promoter of State viability, it cannot but renew its engagement to Central America, a region whose actors and realities it knows better than ever due to its implication in crisis solution and peace building, The EU has become for the region the other alternative global power, besides the US, capable of promoting its insertion in the international system, for which regional integration becomes the crucial option, a stake to which, in conformity with its own experience, the EU has to give its full political and cooperation support, as it is already doing[10], as well as a stake to the shaping of international rules creating an advantageous framework for Central American development. The proposed and foreseen negotiation of an EU - Central America Association Agreement should become a tool for articulating and putting fully into practice such an engagement.

[10] The EU is already deeply engaged in the transformation of the Central American Integration System through different cooperation programs, such as PAIRCA (Central American Regional Integration Support Program, 20 million euros), common policies program (10 million euros), customs union support and others.

VII.- CONCLUSIONS

What conclusions can be drawn from the intellectual trip undertaken in this essay? Such a trip may be different for each of its readers, and these conclusions do not presume to substitute those drawn by them. Precisely because this paper responds to a majeutic vocation, and its purpose is to propose elements for reflection and categories for analysis, the conclusions each reader may draw by comparing the Central American process to other processes are those this essay seeks to elicit.

Personally, this intellectual trip, as well as many years of experience and reflection on Central America and its peace processes, lead me to conclude that although State precariousness is historically undeniable in Central America and needs to be examined, understood and explained, many of its causes have been overcome or are on the way to being overcome. States can be viable in Central America and deserve to be so. Central Americans have endured difficult times to build peace and attain this possibility, whose realization depends on the continued commitment of all relevant national and international actors. Peace consolidation cannot but mean, among other things, State viability consolidation. Central America has not always had the best possible History. But now, from all possible histories from History, this is a likely one; the one with which to engage and on which to act. The question therefore is not what Central America can teach us on the State's precariousness and viability, but rather what can be done –what we can do– to promote State viability and its consolidation in Central America.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

KARL, Terry Lynn

1995 "The hybrid regimes of Central America", in *Journal of Democracy*, vol.6, 3, July, pp. 72-86.

MARTI I PUIG, Salvador

1997 *La revolución enredada. Nicaragua 1977-1996.* Madrid, Los libros de la catarata.

2004 *Tiranías, rebeliones y democracia. Itinerarios políticos comparados en Centroamérica*, Barcelona, Edicions Bellaterra

MONTOBBIO, Manuel

1992 "Construcción nacional y crisis en El Salvador: una aproximación contractual a la problemática salvadoreña", in *Tiempo de Paz*, 24-25, Summer-Fall, pp. 25-31.

1997a "La crisis centroamericana y la construcción de un nuevo orden internacional en América Latina", in *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, 37, pp. 131-149.

1997b "Guatemala y su proceso de paz", in *Política Exterior,* 58, July-August, pp. 99-115.

1999 *La metamorfosis del Pulgarcito. Transición política y proceso de paz en El Salvador*, Barcelona, Icaria-FLACSO.

2000 "Hacia un balance de la política de la Unión Europea hacia Centroamérica," in *Síntesis. Revista de Ciencias Sociales Iberoamericanas*, 33-34, December.

2001a "La política de la Unión Europea hacia Centroamérica," in Fernández de Castro and Benítez Manaut (coordinators), *Las relaciones México-Centroamérica en el inicio del siglo XXI*, Mexico City, ITAM, 2001.

2001b "El Salvador: diez años del proceso de paz", in *Política Exterior*, 82, July-August.

2002 "La coherencia de políticas en los procesos de paz en El Salvador y Guatemala: un análisis comparativo," in *Centroamérica, perspectivas del futuro, Tribuna Internacional,* no. 4*,* Center for International Studies, Barcelona.

2004 "El Salvador 2004. Hacia la gobernabilidad democrática y la viabilidad socioeconómica: retos para el Estado y el sistema político", working paper, *Documento de Trabajo del Real Instituto Elcano*, Madrid, March.

PASTOR, Robert A.

1995 *El remolino. Política exterior de Estados Unidos hacia América Latina y el Caribe*, México, Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

ROUQUIÉ, Alain

1994 *Guerras y paz en Centroamérica*, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica.

TORRES-RIVAS, Edelberto y AGUILERA, Gabriel

1998 *Del autoritarismo a la paz*. Guatemala, FLACSO.

TORRES-RIVAS, Edelberto

2005 *Guatemala. Un edificio de cinco niveles*, mimeo.

ABOUT THE TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PEACE

(www.toledopax.org)

The Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) seeks to contribute to the prevention and resolution of violent or potentially violent international or intra-national conflicts and to the consolidation of peace, within a framework of respect and promotion of Human Rights and democratic values. Thus, the CITpax contributes to the establishment of cooperation pathways and communication channels between the parties involved, governments, NGO's and representatives of all sectors in the civil society.

ACTION PATHWAYS

In order to achieve its objectives, the CITpax employs various tools specially designed for each particular situation, including the following:

- **Second Track Diplomacy,** through the direct facilitation in negotiation processes between relevant political and economic actors, in conflicts where a dialogue pathway becomes necessary to complement or break the deadlock in the official track.

- **Multi-Track Diplomacy and Dialogue Facilitation,** through the creation of dialogue platforms among scholars, experts, activists, local authorities and governing bodies, as well as assisting the development of peace-building capacities in conflict areas.

- **Field Projects,** aimed at improving the capacities for conflict prevention and resolution through confidence-building, research and advocacy of feasible peace policies.

- **Research and Policy Development** of peace-related issues.

- **Professional Development and Training,** seeking to enhance the capacities of practitioners from different institutions working on peace-related issues.

- **Public Awareness and Advocacy,** through information dissemination, policy-oriented publishing and participation in the public debate.

PROGRAMMES

Notwithstanding a progressive extension of its working field to other areas, such as Southeast Europe, the CITpax current activities and projects are divided into three main programmes: two geographical programmes, one centred on Africa and the Middle East, and the other on Latin America, and the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, which thematically complements and supports the regional programmes.

Africa and the Middle East Programme

CITpax is involved in the following activities in Africa and the Middle East. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, CITpax is exploring Track II diplomatic tools to enhance ongoing negotiations and the status of the peace process. The Programme also intends to progressively address some of the core challenges of the region such as peace perspectives between Syria and Israel and the conditions for the establishment of a cooperation and security system in the Middle East. Addressing regional conflicts, discreet efforts are being made to bring regional parties to explore venues for strengthening local peaceful resolutions. Focusing on the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and the enhancement of civil society in several countries in the Middle East, CITpax is also engaged in the North Africa context, with an emphasis on the Western Sahara conflict and the future of economic integration in the Maghreb.

Areas of the Programme:

- Regional Stability in the Middle East
- Emphasis on the Palestinian Israeli conflict
- Economic Integration of the Maghreb
- Transition to democracy

Latin America Programme

CITpax activities in this area include second track diplomacy aimed at bringing together conflicting parties; the promotion of dialogue to build up consensus; field missions for the identification of problematic issues in tense areas and political research on questions that could have a negative effect on democracy in Latin America. In particular, the programme focuses on the Andean Region with an initial emphasis on Colombia. It promotes confidence building initiatives and facilitates better understanding of the main issues related to the conflict in Colombia. Moreover, the CITpax examines past regional experiences in order to draw practical lessons to promote initiatives that pursue political dialogue and conflict prevention.

Areas of the Programme:

- Political regional dialogue
- Institutional stability in the Andean Region
- Alternatives to the Colombian conflict
- Promotion of "benign borders"

Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme

The programme concentrates on the study and support of negotiation processes and peace agreements, as well as on the facilitation and elaboration of recommendations to those countries going through post-conflict situations. CITpax's activities, which are based on the idea of human security, fall within a long-term global perspective. Thus, the projects designed within this programme intend to contribute to building and consolidating peace in those contexts where violence has been formally overcome.

It also aims at formulating strategies that may prevent potential conflicts by trying to address the causes and by proposing solutions for their symptoms. The programme will also study and analyse multinational peacekeeping interventions and work to improve the tools for training those professionals that participate in peace operations. This includes UN Peacekeeping Operations as well as other multilateral interventions that result in regime change and/or post-conflict reconstruction focusing on both civil-military relations and the civil roles conducted by military personnel.

Areas of the Programme:

- International civil administration
- Rule of law, institution-building and strengthening of democracy
- Transitional justice
- Humanitarian assistance
- Electoral processes
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
- Strengthening of civil society and support for the most vulnerable sectors
- Early responses to crisis situations
- Socioeconomic dimension of conflicts
- Regional dimension of conflicts
- Development Cooperation as an instrument for conflict prevention and peace-building

STAFF

Director-General: Emilio Cassinello, Ambassador of Spain.

Blanca Antonini, Director, Latin America Programme.
George E. Irani, Director, Africa and the Middle East Programme.
Claudia Medina, Director of Projects and Operations - Researcher.
Juan Garrigues, Desk Officer, Latin America Programme.
Stuart Reigeluth, Desk Officer, Africa and the Middle East Programme.
Gabriel Reyes, Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme.

ADVISORY COUNCIL

Emma Bonino, Member of the European Parliament.
Kim Campbell, Secretary-General of the Club of Madrid, former Prime Minister of Canada.
Baltasar Garzón, Judge of the National Audience, Spain.
Marrack Goulding, Dean, St. Anthony's College, Oxford University.
Rosario Green, former Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Bernard Kouchner, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo.
Juan Manuel Santos, former Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Colombia.
Pierre Schori, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Cote d'Ivoire.
Francesc Vendrell, Special Representative of the UE for Afghanistan.
Federico Mayor Zaragoza, former Director-General of the UNESCO.

ABOUT THE TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PEACE
(www.toledopax.org)

Trustees:

MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES Y DE COOPERACIÓN

AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA DE COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL

Castilla-La Mancha

Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Toledo

FUNDACIÓN JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET

FRIDE
FUNDACIÓN PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y EL DIÁLOGO EXTERIOR

Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
José María Barreda, President, Regional Government of Castilla-La Mancha
José Manuel Molina, Mayor of Toledo

Shlomo Ben-Ami, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Israel
Antonio Garrigues Walker, President, Fundación José Ortega y Gasset
Diego Hidalgo Schnur, President, FRIDE
Gregorio Marañón, President, Real Fundación de Toledo
Nabil Shaath, Deputy Prime Minister, Palestinian National Authority
Carlos Westendorp, Spanish Ambassador to the United States

Corporate Advisory Council:

Strategic Partners:

IBERIA

GRUPO Villar Mir

Telefónica

Project Partners:

CCM